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PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
Michael P. Seng*
In order for Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 to practically prohibit employment discrimination against
handicapped persons, a broad array of effective and prompt rem-
edies is needed. In this Article, the author examines judicial
findings of legislative intent to create private causes of action in
the enactment of various civil rights legislation and concludes that
a private cause of action is an available mechanism to enforce the
federal statutory scheme prohibiting discrimination in the employ-
ment of handicapped individuals. While Sections 503 and 504 are
silent as to whether a private cause of action exists, Professor
Seng clearly shows that the same reasons that permit private causes
of action under other civil rights legislation holds true for Sections
503 and 504, thus realizing Congress' intent to fuly protect hand-
icapped individuals.
If equal employment opportunities for handicapped persons are to
be more than empty promises, a prompt judicial remedy is required.
Experience in the civil rights area indicates that administrative rem-
edies are no substitute for the relief which can be provided by
courts. While many states now provide means for the protection of
handicapped persons, this Article will focus on the relief available
through the federal judicial system. The Federal Rehabilitation Act of
1973 1 is often referred to as the Bill of Rights for Handicapped
Persons. Sections 503 and 504 of the Act are modeled on some of the
earlier federal declarations designed to eliminate racial discrimina-
tion. 2
Section 503 requires federal contractors to establish affirmative ac-
tion programs to employ and advance in employment qualified hand-
icapped individuals. 3  The President is directed to promulgate rules
* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., LL.B., University of
Notre Dame.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (Supp. V 1975). A "handicapped individual," for purposes of
Sections 503 and 504 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 793 and 794 (Supp. V 1975), is defined as "any
person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded as
having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. V 1975).
2. In addition to Sections 503 and 504, a separate section of the Act requires that each
department and agency in the Executive Branch have an affirmative action program for the
hiring, placement and advancement of handicapped persons in that agency or department. 29
U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. V 1975).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. V 1975). Section 503 imposes this requirement on federal con-
tractors where the contract exceeds $2500.
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to implement this section and the Department of Labor is directed to
investigate complaints and take appropriate action against noncom-
plying contractors. The provisions of Section 503 are similar to Execu-
tive Order 11246, which requires affirmative action programs to
eliminate racial discrimination by federal contractors.4
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that no handicapped
person "shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 5  The terminology of Section 504 is similar to both Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 which prohibits racial discrimina-
tion by recipients of federal funds, and Title IX of the 1972 Education
Amendments, 7 which prohibits sex discrimination under any educa-
tional program or activity receiving federal funds. However, contrary
to Section 503, Title VI and Title IX, Section 504 does not expressly
require the President or other executive official to promulgate rules
to implement the Section; nor does Section 504 provide any particu-
lar mode of administrative enforcement. 8
Both Sections 503 and 504 are silent as to whether an aggrieved
individual can go to court and seek either legal or equitable relief to
force compliance by a recipient of federal funds. Whether a private
cause of action is available under a federal statute is determined by
4. Section 503 does differ from Executive Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), in
important respects. Executive Order 11246 has generally been held not to create a private cause
of action. See, e.g., Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Weise v. Syracuse U., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Traylor v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375
F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 977 (1967). But see Lewis v. Western Airlines,
379 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Although no private cause of action exists against an
employer, a mandamus action has been upheld against federal officials who failed to enforce the
Executive Order. Legal Air Society v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974). However,
such precedents are of limited authority as to whether a private cause of action exists under
Section 503. A serious constitutional argument can be raised concerning the ability of the Presi-
dent, without delegation from Congress, to create a private cause of action. See Traylor v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. at 877 n. 12 (N.D. Cal. 1975). No such impediment exists
when construing an Act of Congress.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Supp. V 1975).
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. V 1975).
8. Section 400 of the Rehabilitation Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement Subchapters 1, III and IV of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 780(b)
(Supp. V 1975). Sections 503 and 504 are not included in this provision.
On April 28, 1976, the President issued Executive Order 11914. This Order authorizes HEW
and other concerned agencies to issue rules and regulations to implement Section 504 and
requires federal agencies to suspend or terminate federal assistance if the recipient of federal
funds is not in compliance. Regulations have since been issued by HEW. See 42 Fed. Reg.
22676-22685 (1977). 45 C.F.R. § 84-84.99 (1977). The legislative history of the 1974 Amend-
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the intent of the legislature. The legislative intent regarding Sections
503 and 504 is not clear. Except for the administrative procedures
specified in Section 503, no remedies are defined. Nonetheless, it is
known that Congress does not create mere hypothetical rights.9
Congress intends that its legislation be effective and its pronounce-
ments enforced. 10 Especially where Congress has not mandated the
promulgation and implementation of administrative rules or provided
for a specific enforcement mechanism, the courts will presume that
Congress intended they exercise all appropriate enforcement powers,
both legal and equitable."
In this respect, Section 504 is similar to Sections 1981 and 1982,12
ments to Section 504 shows that Congress did contemplate delegation of responsibility to HEW
to set up an effective Federal approach to the problems of handicapped persons. See [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6391. This legislative history not only strongly supports
the power of HEW and other federal agencies to issue regulations, but, as some courts have
noted, may actually require HEW to promulgate regulations to effectuate Section 504. See
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1281 (7th Cir. 1977). However, legislative
history does not support an argument that Congress intended to preclude a private cause of
action under Section 504. Indeed, all it establishes is that Congress in 1974 intended HEW and
other federal agencies to take an active part in implementing Section 504 objectives. As more
fully developed hereafter, the statute itself is designed to be a powerful and comprehensive tool
to break down barriers against the handicapped.
9. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). In addition to
the issue of the availability of a private right of action pursuant to Sections 503 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, there is the problem of the applicability of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction to such actions. See Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., id. at 1287. The issue of
primary jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this article.
10. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1961); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112,
115 (1879); Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 1971).
11. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964); Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brother-
hood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569 (1930); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
12. 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 provides:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind
and to no other."
42 U.S.C. Section 1982 provides:
"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold and convey real and personal property."
Sections 1981 and 1982 have been held to prohibit discrimination by private individuals and
companies, as well as that which results from governmental action. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Run-
yon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). By finding support for these Amendments in the 13th
Amendment, the Supreme Court has been able to avoid the "state action" problems implicit in
the 14th Amendment.
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legislation enacted to protect civil rights after the Civil War. ' 3 Both
Sections 1981 and 1982 are declaratory and are silent as to their en-
forcement mechanisms, but the Supreme Court has sustained the use
of both equitable and legal remedies to implement the protections
The Supreme Court has broadly construed Section 1981 to prohibit all forms of racial dis-
crimination and to protect white persons as well as non-white persons from discriminatory
employment practices based on race. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273
(1976). The lower courts have been reluctant to extend the protections of Section 1981 to dis-
criminatory employment practices of a non-racial character. While Section 1981 has been held
to prohibit employment discrimination based on alienage because of its broadened statutory
language protecting "all persons" and not just citizens, as is the case of Section 1982, e.g.,
Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 653-54, (5th Cir. 1974), lower courts have
held that the Section does not prohibit discrimination based solely on national origin (see, e.g.,
Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Ortega v. Merit Ins.
Co., 433 F. Supp 135 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (finding Hispanics to be covered as a "race")), or on sex
(see, e.g., Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 522 F.2d 1235, 1240 n.9 (7th Cir. 1975);
League of Academic Women v. Regents, 343 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal. 1972)). Attempts by
handicapped persons to sue for employment discrimination under Section 1981 are therefore
likely to be unsuccessful. Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous court in McDonald, im-
plicitly recognized the limited scope of Section 1981. His examination of the drafting of 1981
and especially the House Amendment by Representative Wilson, which added the qualifying
words "as is enjoyed by white citizens", lead him to conclude that these words were added due
to Congress' concern that, quoting Wilson, the rights protected by the Act "might be extended
to all citizens, whether male or female, majors or minors." 427 U.S. at 293. The purpose of the
amendment, Justice Marshall found, was "to emphasize the racial character of the rights being
protected", 427 U.S. at 293, quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966) (emphasis
added).
13. Section 504 does not expressly provide judicial relief as does 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
expressly provides that an injured party may sue state officials for civil rights violations in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),
which expressly provides an action for the recovery of damages against conspirators who deprive
persons of their right to equal protection of the laws.
Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to be read against the background of common law tort liability,
the Supreme Court has held that Congress intended to create a federal remedy for violations of
civil rights which cannot be defeated either by state judicial or administrative remedies. Damico
v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). It can be argued that if
Section 504 gives handicapped individuals a right to be free from employment discrimination
and a person acting tinder color of law so discriminates, he can be sied for damages and an
injunction under Section 1983. The Supreme Court has not had occasion to construe the Section
1983 phrase "rights secured by the . . . laws," but lower courts have held that Section 1983
actions can be used to safeguard civil rights created not only by the Constitution but also by
federal statutes. See citations in ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVLi RIGHTS ACTS (1971) § 73. The only
exception enunciated by the Courts is when the statute creating the right provides an exclusive
remedy. Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture
Machine Operators of U.S. and Can., 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. den., 340 U.S. 827
(1951). This exception would not be an impediment to a Section 1983 action predicated on a
Section 504 violation. See discussion in text infra.
Although Section 1985(3) provides expressly only for an action for damages, lower courts have
afforded injured parties equitable and declaratory relief in appropriate cases brought tinder that
section. See Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971); Mizell v. North Broward Hosp.
1120
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afforded by these Sections. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 14 the
Court sustained equitable relief in a Section 1982 action against a
private individual who practiced racial discrimination against a black
home buyer. 15 Also, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 16 the
Court sustained the use of both compensatory and punitive damage
awards to the injured party in a housing discrimination suit under
Section 1982. The Court noted that "the existence of a statutory right
implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies." 17
Furthermore, the Court stated that where the disregard of the statute
resulted "in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party
in default is implied.""'
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 19 the Court sustained
the inherent power of courts to shape relief against constitutional de-
privations, even without statutory authorization. 20  The Bivens Court
also rejected the narrow argument that damages should be made
Dist., 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970); Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969). If racial
bias, which Congress can prevent tinder the 13th Amendment, or "'perhaps otherwise class'
based, invidiously discriminatory animus" is present, or if one of the narrow privileges and
immunities of United States citizenship, i.e., the right to interstate travel, is implicated, the
Supreme Court has held that Section 1985(3) will reach private conspiracies as well as con-
spiracies involving state officers. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971). The lower
courts are not in agreement as to whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory
intent other than racial bias is actionable under Section 1985(3). See, e.g., Murphy v. Mount
Carmel High Sch., 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976); Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924
(9th Cir. 1975); Marlow v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973); Action v. Gannon, 450
F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971); Abbot v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 643 (D.N.H.
1977); Curran v. Portland Super. Sch. Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Me. 1977). No cases
have been reported on whether private conspirators who refuse to hire handicapped persons can
be sued under 1985(3).
14. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
15. Id. at 420-22. J. Harlan, joined by J. White, dissented on the ground that in enacting
Title ViII of the Fair Housing Law of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 & 3631, Congress had
provided a comprehensive scheme for dealing with this kind of discrimination and that the
Court, as a matter of policy, should not develop a common law of forbidden racial discrimina-
tion under Section 1982. 392 U.S. at 450. Congressional concern about the interpretation and
coverage of Section 1982 was one of the motivating factors behind the adoption of Title VIII.
The majority, however, broadly construed Section 1982. Similar coverage and enforcement was
afforded to Section 1981. 392 U.S. at 422-36. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). The majority position in these
cases supports the strong presumption in favor of full judicial enforcement of civil rights absent
a showing of clear Congressional intent to the contrary.
16. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
17. Id. at 239.
18. Id. quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
19. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20. 403 U.S. at 397. The Court relied on Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 163 (1803),
reaffirming that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every indi-
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available only when the Court deemed them to be necessary to en-
force constitutional rights. The Court held that an injured party is
entitled to redress for his injuries through the remedial mechanism
normally available in the federal courts, absent an "explicit congres-
sional declaration that persons injured ... may not recover money
damages. . ." but "must instead be remitted to another remedy,
equally effective in the view of Congress." 21
In Bivens, the Court created a presumption in favor of fill reme-
dial enforcement by the judiciary. This presumption was consistent
with the Supreme Court's leading decision finding a private cause of
action under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,22
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.23 In Borak, the Court acknowledged that
Section 14(a) made no reference to a private cause of action.
Nevertheless, the Court found that among the Section's chief pur-
poses was the protection of investors, "which certainly implies the
availability of judicial relief when necessary to achieve that result." 24
In finding that the courts have power to grant all necessary remedial
relief, the Court analogized to the antitrust laws where the threat of
civil -treble damages or injunctive relief served as a "most effective
weapon" to enforce the law. 25
Finally, in Cort v. Ash, 26 the Supreme Court articulated a set of
factors to be considered in determining whether a private cause of
action may be used to enforce a federal statutory scheme. The Cort
vidual to claim the protection of the laws when he receives an injury." Congress had not
enacted a federal statue allowing private persons to sue federal officers for constitutional viola-
tions as it had against state officers in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs in Bivens thus premised
their action on 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) and the inherent power of federal courts to afford relief
against unconstitutional deprivations. In Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the Supreme Court
had held that the lower courts should not have summarily dismissed a similar claim for lack of
jurisdiction. 327 U.S. at 684. The Court stated that "where federally protected rights have been
invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their rem-
edies so as to grant the necessary relief." Id. The Court in Bivens reaffirmed this language
and noted that damges have been historically regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of
personal interest. 403 U.S. at 392. Bivens involved a claim against federal agents under the
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has not decided whether the courts will award dam-
ages for other constitutional violations. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.
1977).
21. 403 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
23. 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
24. 377 U.S. at 432. While the Court used the term "necessary" in Borak, it did not use it
in the strict sense that the government later urged and the Court rejected in Bivens, but rather
in the sense of what relief is appropriate. It reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Bell v. Hood,
note 20 supra, that 'federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done." 377 U.S. at 433, quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684. But note the more restricting
use of the word "necessary" in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
25. 377 U.S. at 432.
26. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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"tests" have become the starting point and have provided the
framework for the analysis of subsequent private cause of action cases.
In Cort, a private cause of action for damages and injunctive relief
was instituted by a stockholder against his corporation for alleged
violations of title 18 Section 610, of the United States Code which
prohibited corporations from making contributions or expenditures in
connection with specified federal elections. Section 610 provided only
for criminal penalties against the corporation; it did not provide for
civil enforcement. 2 7  The Court articulated four factors relevant to
whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action in favor
of corporate shareholders.2 8  First, is the plaintiff "one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted?" Second, is there
any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a rem-
edy? Fourth, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on fed-
eral law? 29
The first factor, whether plaintiff belongs to "one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted," seems clearly to
have been the most important consideration in Cort,30 the four fac-
27. 422 U.S. at 78. The statute was amended to provide for administrative enforcement
through a federal election commission after suit was filed but before the Supreme Court deci-
sion. These amendments were not directly before the Court.
28. The Court acknowledged that this suit was filed by the plaintiff only derivatively as a
stockholder and hence the Court would not address his standing as a citizen or voter. 422 U.S.
at 77. Absent a finding that Congress had conferred standing on citizens and voters, there is no
reason to suppose that the suit would have fared any differently if plaintiff had redefined his
status. Compare, United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
29. 422 U.S. at 78.
30. Indeed, in nearly every Supreme Court case since Cart, although the Court goes
through the four tests seriatum, the resolution of the first Cart factor seems to be the deciding
issue. For instance, in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., the Court refused to allow a private
cause of action under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act by an unsuccessful contender
for control of a target corporation against a successful contender. 430 U.S. at 41. The majority
concluded that Congress enacted 14(e) because it was concerned with protecting the sharehol-
ders of target companies and did not intend that the statute be used as a club by one contender
against another in a take-over fight. The Court expressly reserved the question whether share-
holder-offerees of the target corporation might have standing in another case to sue for viola-
tions of Section 14(e). 430 U.S. at 42, n.28. Having decided that 14(e) was not enacted for the
especial benefit of takeover bidders, the majority used this conclusion to answer the other Cort
inquiries that Congress did not intend to create a private remedy in favor of the plaintiffs, that a
private action would be inconsistent with the careful legislative scheme, which was one of com-
plete neutrality between competitive bidders, and that the parties were relegated to whatever
remedy they would have under state law.
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tors seeming to have been articulated in a descending order of impor-
tance. The first test poses policy considerations, and, in a broader
context, has certain constitutional underpinnings based on the re-
quirement that a proper "case or controversy" be before the Court.
Whether a plaintiff has standing to sue under a federal statute is de-
termined by whether he is in the "zone of interest" Congress in-
tended to be protected by the enactment. 31
In Cort, the Supreme Court found that Congress, in enacting the
Campaign Contributions Act, regarded the protection of corporate
stockholders as, "at best a secondary concern" and not within the
"zone of interest" protected by the Act. 32 The primary focus of the
legislation, the Court stated, was against the aggregate wealth and
possible corrupting influence of corporations on federal elections.
Thus, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to create a
private cause of action in favor of corporate shareholders. The Court
contrasted this conclusion with Bivens, where it had found a clearly
articulated federal right in the plaintiff, and to Borak, where it had
found the presence of a pervasive legislative scheme governing the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant classes. 33
There can be no dispute that handicapped persons are within the
"zone of interest" to be protected by Section 504 and that the statute
was enacted for their especial benefit. Section 504 was intended to
prevent employers from discriminating against the handicapped. The
statute necessarily creates rights in the plaintiffs and governs future
relations between handicapped persons and employers.
The second factor articulated in Cort was whether there is any in-
tent, explicit or implicit, either to create or deny a privately enforce-
able remedy. The Court acknowledged that it is not necessary to
show an intention to create a private cause of action where it is clear
that federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights. How-
ever, an explicit intention to deny a private cause of action is control-
ling. 34 Section 610 did not explicitly foreclose a private remedy, but
because the Court found that Congress was, at most, only secondarily
The Cort factors are not absolute requirements but are guides for the courts. If there is a
statutory basis for inferring a private cause of action, even the first CVrt factor, as well as any of
the others, may be dispensed with as non-essential. See dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. at 66-67. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice
Brennan, the author of the Cort "'tests." Justice Stevens notes that even Borak itself does not
meet the majority's "especial class" test as narrowly applied in Piper.
31. Data Processing v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
32. 422 U.S. at 81.
33. Id. at 82.
34. id.
1124 [Vol. 27:1117
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concerned with the rights of stockholders, it decided that no private
cause of action existed under the Campaign Contributions Act.3 5 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied primarily on the resolution
of the first Cort factor-that plaintiffs were not the especial ben-
eficiaries of the law. On the other hand, the same inference cannot
be drawn from Congress' silence to Section 504. Because handi-
capped persons are the especial beneficiaries of Section 504, and be-
cause Congress did not expressly deny a private cause of action, cre-
ate an exclusive administrative remedy, or impose criminal sanctions,
a private cause of action must be inferred.
The third Cort factor-whether a private cause of action is consis-
tent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme-also
favors the creation of a private cause of action under Section 504.
Section 504 provides no criminal sanctions and does not on its face
mandate a particular administrative procedure. Thus a judicial in-
terpretation of Section 504 which foreclosed a private civil remedy,
would render Section 504 a nullity. It would be a mere declaration
dependent upon the whim of executive officials for its enforce-
ment.36 Certainly, a court order requiring an employer to cease dis-
criminating against the handicapped, coupled with the threat of dam-
ages, furthers the primary Congressional purpose of Section 504.
The fourth Cort factor-the appropriateness of relegating plaintiffs
to their state remedies-has never, standing alone, been the deter-
mining factor in any Supreme Court case. 37 Indeed, Congress is free
to create a remedial scheme in favor of plaintiffs, despite tho. exis-
tence of remedies created by state law. 3 8  In Borak, the Court noted
35. Id. at 83-84.
36. Id. at 84. Because the Campaign Contributions Act provided penalties against violators,
and because a derivative suit would only permit directors to "in effect" borrow corporate funds
for awhile, the Supreme Court found in Cort, that an action for damages really would not
further the legislative goal and would not decrease the impact of the use of illegal funds upon an
election already past. Id.
37. In formulating its fourth factor in Cort, the Court cited Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647, 652 (1963), which held that an investigator for the House Unamerican Activities Committee
could not be sued for abuse of the subpoena power. The federal statute governing the issuance
of subpoenas had not been complied with, but no violation of the 4th Amendment had occur-
red, and the subpoena had never been given coercive effect. The majority in Wheeldin noted
that in cases for damages for abuse of power, federal officials had traditionally been governed by
state law. Id. at 649-50. Subsequently, in Bivens, on a damage claim arising out of a vio-
lation of the 4th Amendment, the Supreme Court refused to accept the federal officers'
contentions that state laws regulating trespass and the invasion of privacy provide sufficient
protection to citizens against invasions by federal officers and that the scope of a federal officer's
authority, or lack of it, depends upon the state in which the act occurred. 403 U.S. at 394-395.
See also Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 403 U.S. 462, 478-479 (1977).
38. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 41.
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that federal law could be compromised to the extent that state laws
differ or might impede a suit. 39 However, in Cort the Court distin-
guished this problem on the ground that Congress was concerned not
with regulating corporations but with dulling their impact in federal
elections. Whether or not state law allowed a derivative cause of ac-
tion for damages would neither aid nor hinder the primary goal of the
Election Contributions Act.40 Logic dictates that Congress would not
pass a statute prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped by
recipients of federal funds and then relegate aggrieved persons to
whatever remedy, if any, the states might provide. Thus, even
strictly applying the four criteria enunciated in Cort, Section 504
must be construed to create a private cause of action.
The language of Section 504 is closely patterned after Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Lau v. Nichols,41 the Supreme Court
upheld a private cause of action under Title VI. In Lau, Chinese
students sued the San Francisco school system alleging racial dis-
crimination because the school system failed to provide specialized
instruction for non-English speaking Chinese students. The Court
held that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action under Section 601
of the Civil Rights Act and remanded the matter to the District Court
for the fashioning of appropriate relief.42
39. 377 U.S. at 434.
40. 422 U.S. at 85.
41. 414 U.S. 563, 568-69. (1974).
42. Id. at 569. The Supreme Court held in Lau that, under Title VI, discrimination was
barred which had that effect even though no purposeful design was present. Id. at 568. The
Court thus interpreted Title VI in a manner consistent with its interpretation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, which outlaws racial, ethnic, religious and sex
discrimination in both public and private employment. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), the Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits the use of all job requirements or
tests which have the effect of impeding the employment of any of the classes protected in the
statute. The mere showing of such an effect by the plaintiff shifts the burden of proof to the
employer to show that the requirement is "job-related." Id. at 431. Even if the employer meets
this burden, it remains open to the plaintiff to show that other selection devices, without a
similarly undesirable racial effect, would serve the employer's legitimate interests. Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-35 (1975). The lower courts have generally interpreted
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, which prohibits housing discrimin-
ation, as not requiring proof of "purposeful" discrimination. Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 197.7); Residents Advisory
Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1974). Because the language of Section 504 is so similar to these other statutes and
because all of these statutes promote equal opportunities, it is doubtful courts would require
plaintiffs in a Section 504 action to assume a higher burden and prove defendants acted out of
animus against handicapped persons. For this reason, there is an advantage for handicapped
persons to stand on their statutory remedies rather than to premise a cause of action solely on
constitutional grounds, which the courts have generally held to require proof of "purposeful"
discrimination. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Lau, however, must be read with caution. Justice Blackmun, in his
concurring opinion, focused upon the class action aspects of the suit.
For him, numbers were at the heart of the suit and he did not con-
sider Lau dispositive of whether a single child who spoke a language
other than English could require a school to provide him with special
instruction. Justice Blackmun's concern about the affirmative obliga-
tions of schools to expend sums to support special programs applica-
ble only to one child would not apply with equal force in an employ-
ment case, where the plaintiff is seeking the removal of all barriers
which are not "job related" or justified by "business necessity." 43 The
burdens and costs to an employer who is required to cease dis-
criminating against qualified handicapped individuals will probably be
considerably less than those to a school which is required to institute
a special program of instruction.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,44 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals focused on Justice Blackmun's concurrence in a sex discrimi-
nation suit brought by a female applicant against the University of
Chicago Medical School under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972. The court found that the plaintiff did not have an
individual cause of action. The court distinguished Lau on the ground
that it involved an attempt to deprive "large groups" of minorities
their right to an equal education. The court also narrowly read the
Supreme Court's private cause of action cases and stated that a pri-
vate action should not "be lightly implied under a statute where Con-
gress had not provided one-especially where Congress had provided
Another reason why plaintiffs in a 504 action should not be required to prove "purposeful-
ness" is because a discriminatory animus against handicapped persons may be very difficult to
show. "Purposeflul" discrimination is usually best shown by statistical evidence which requires
defining some homogeneous class. Defining a class of handicapped individuals with common.
characteristics may be very difficult. Therefore, the use of statistical evidence, which is so im-
portant in any case of race discrimination, may be very difficult in a case involving discrimin-
ations against handicapped persons. Compare Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) with Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977). The difficulty in identifying a "homogeneous class of handicapped persons" in an
employment discriminations suit, see, Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202 (N.D.
Tex. 1977), is a strong counter-argument to any suggestion that Justice Blackmun's "numbers"
concerns in Lau be extended to private actions tinder Section 504. See accompanying text infra.
43. See note 42, supra, for a discussion of "job-relatedness" defenses tinder Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. The new HEW regulations implementing Section 504 place an affirmative
duty on employers to make "reasonable accommodations" to facilitate the employment of handi-
capped persons unless the employer can show that the accommodations will impose an "undue
hardship" on his operations. But see Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 903 (1977),
where the Supreme Court narrowly construed the affirmative duties of an employer under the
religious discrimination provision of Title VII.
44. 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 3142 (1978).
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for other means of enforcement. " 45 The Supreme Court has agreed
to review Cannon. Even if the Court upholds the lower court, how-
ever, Section 504 is distinguishable. Congress included enforcement
mechanisms in Title IX under which a single individual can at least
partially vindicate his rights administratively. On its face, Section 504
provides no similar option to negate the need for judicial enforcement
through private actions.
A majority of the justices addressed the question whether Title VI
affords aggrieved individuals a private cause of action for racial
discrimination and answered it affirmatively in Regents of University
of California v. Bakke.46 The Title VI questions were handled
somewhat obliquely, so the precedential value of the various opinions
can be variously interpreted. Nonetheless, as Justice White com-
mented in his separate opinion, four justices were of the view that
such a private cause of action exists and four other justices assumed it
for purposes of that case. 47 Only Justice White stated without qual-
ification that no private cause of action exists under Title VI. He felt
that a private cause of action would be inconsistent with the under-
lying legislative scheme and contrary to the legislative intent. He
noted that Congress had expressly provided for private actions in
other titles of the 1964 Act, and he felt "it would be quite incredible
if Congress, after so carefully attending to the matter of private ac-
tions in other titles of the Act, intended silently to create a private
cause of action to enforce Title VI." 48  He also noted that Congress
intended federal agencies to adopt rules to implement Title VI and
that funds could be cut off only pursuant to those rules and after a
hearing and voluntary means to secure compliance had been
exhausted. 49 He further emphasized the "clear" statements of legis-
lators that a private cause of action under Title VI does not exist.5"
Whether or not Justice White's views are accepted by the Court in
future cases, and the opinions of the other Justices indicate they will
not, Section 504 and its legislative history contain no comparable in-
firmities to mitigate against private enforcement.
Justice Powell, who announced the opinion of the Court, found it
unnecessary to determine in the abstract whether a private cause of
action exists tinder Title VI. He noted that the question had not been
45. 559 F.2d at 1074 (emphasis added).
46. 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978).
47. Id. at 2794.
48. Id. at 2795.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2797.
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raised below and therefore assumed that for purposes of the case the
respondent had a right of action. 51 However, in a footnote to his
opinion, Justice Powell indicated he may lean to Justice White's posi-
tion when and if the issue is ever squarely presented again. He noted
that "several comments in the debates cast doubt on the existence of
any intent to create a private right of action." 52 Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun stated only that they agreed with Justice
Powell's conclusion that it was not necessary to resolve whether there
is a private cause of action under Title VI. 53
Finally, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Stewart and Rehnquist, several of whom have been quite reluc-
tant to create private causes of action under other statutes, explicitly
held that Title VI creates a private cause of action. Relying on Lau
and several other lower court opinions, they stated that the courts,
including the Supreme Court, have "unanimously concluded or as-
sumed that a private cause of action may be maintained under Title
VI. ' ' 54 They further noted that Congress had repeatedly enacted
legislation predicated on the assumption that Title VI could be en-
forced by a private action. For our analysis here, it is important that
in making this statement, these justices cited Section 504 and the
legislative history discussed in Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Au-
thority.55  These justices also went through the four Cort "tests" and
found them to be satisfied. 56
The private cause of action aspects of Section 504 have been ad-
dressed in a number of lower court decisions. 57  The most important
is Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority.58 In Lloyd, mobil-
ity-disabled persons sued the Chicago and Regional Transportation
Authorities alleging a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
51. Id. at 2745.
52. Id. at 2745 n.18.
53. Id. at 2768.
54. Id. at 2814.
55. Id. at 2815 n.27.
56. Id. at 2815 n.28.
57. See, e.g., Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978);
United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d
863 (2d Cir. 1977); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Doe v. New York
University, 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Crawford v. University of North Carolina, 440
F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.C. S.C.
1977); Curmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd. on other grounds, 556
F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); Hairston v. Drosich, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.W.Va. 1976).
58. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). Lloyd takes on special significance because of the favora-
ble reading given it by four justices in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. at
2815. (emphasis added.) See also Drennon v. Philadelphia General Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809,
815 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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Act and other statutes.5 9 They sought a court order requiring all bus
and train systems to accomodate mobility-disabled persons. The Dis-
trict Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground
that Section 504 was merely hortatory and did not create a private
cause of action. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and
remanded the case based on two conclusions. First, the Seventh Cir-
cuit relied upon Lau to hold that Section 504, at least when consid-
ered with the 1976 Urban Mass Transportation Administration's reg-
ulations implimenting it, established affirmative rights.6 0  Second,
the Lloyd Court applied the Cort factors to the Rehabilitation Act and
concluded that "a private cause of action must be implied from Sec-
tion 504." 61
59. 548 F.2d at 1278. In addition to the Section 504 violations, plaintiffs claimed violations
of the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151, 4152.
60. The Court in Lloyd limited its language so that it decided only, as in Lai, that affirma-
tive rights existed tinder Section 504, when considered with the HEW rules that implement it.
Experience under the various post-Civil War civil rights statutes and Title VIII indicate that,
even in the absence of administrative rules and regulations, courts are competent to provide
standards to prevent discrimination. The administrative regulations, as "clarifying amendments,"
do have cogent significance in construing Section 504. 548 F.2d at 1285. An advantage of the
HEW rules is that they provide for administrative consistency within the federal government.
See 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6391 (1974). The Supreme Court has given deference to
EEOC guidelines in interpreting Title V1II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000,
c-1 to c-9 (1974). See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 431. Brt see General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). It can be assumed that similar deference will be accorded
the rules implementing Section 504. But even without considering these rules, the court could
have found a private cause of action tinder Section 504. There is no indication that Congress
intended that the availability of judicial remedies depend on whether a federal executive agency
has promulgated administrative rules and regulations, which it is not explicitly required to do
under the act. Compare Guerncey v. Rich Plan, 751 ATRR D-1 (N.D. Ind. 1976), where the
District Court distinguished prior cases which refised to find a private cause of action in the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The prior cases relied on the Congressional intent to subrogate
the consumer's interest to the "expert judgment" of the Federal Trade Commission. In
Guerncey, the court held that once the commission has exercised this judgment in the form of a
cease and desist order, there is no longer any need for the courts to refise to lend their aid to
the consumer. It found a legislative intent under those circumstances to afford the consuming
public a private judicial remedy. No such legislative scheme is explicit or implicit in Section
504.
61. Lloyd has been the basis for a number of cases finding a private cause of action tinder
Section 504. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, supra; Leary v. Crapsey, supra; United Handicapped
Fed'n. v. Andre, supra; Doe v. New York Univ., supra; Crawford v. University of N. Carolina,
supra; Barnes v. Converse College, supra. In Bartels v. Biernot, 427 F. Stipp. 226 (E.D. Wis.
1977), a case strikingly similar to Lloyd, 427 F. Supp. at 230 n.7, Judge Warren granted plain-
tiffs' motion for simmary judgment and ordered that the defendants, the Milwaukee County
Transit Board (MCTB) be permanently enjoined from acquiring or operating any new mass
transit vehicles "which are not designed for accessibility and effective utilizations by mobility
handicapped individuals, until such time as defendants can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the
court that such transportation facilities have been planned, designed, and are being made avail-
able to such individuals in a non-discriminatory manner." 427 F. Stipp. at 233. The court also
permanently enjoined the Urban Mass Transportation Administrators (UMTA) from releasing
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The Court's opinion in Lloyd is not without qualification. The
Court referred to its earlier opinion in Cannon and noted that Lloyd
involved a "huge class" of handicapped individuals. 62  The Court's
concern with the size of the class makes some sense in the context of
a public transportation suit where the problem of designing a transit
system to accomodate the handicapped may require emphasis on the
generalized problems of handicapped persons rather than on a par-
ticularized problem in an individual case. This concern is not present
in a private action for employment discrimination. In such an action,
the dispute centers on the particular requirements of the job as they
relate to the particular qualifications of the individual applicant. Ex-
perience in other areas of employment discrimination demonstrates
the importance of both class and individual actions to vindicate Con-
gressional purposes. 63
The same reasons that support a private cause of action under Sec-
tion 504 support a private cause of action under Section 503.64 Sec-
tion 503 requires federal contractors, with contracts totaling more
than $2,500, to implement affirmative action programs to employ and
advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals. Under a
Cort analysis, handicapped persons are certainly the especial ben-
eficiaries of Section 503.65 Congress has not explicitly denied a pri-
vate cause of action under Section 503, and, therefore, the strong
presumption in favor of judicial enforcement applies. Furthermore, a
private cause of action will advance the purposes of the Act, and the
statutory scheme again indicates that Congress wanted to provide a
federal remedy and not to relegate aggrieved parties to inconsistent
state enforcement. 66
any federal funds until MCTB complied with the aforementioned order. This order was entered
despite the fact that the UMTA had already approved a federal grant of $17 million for the
proposed Milwaukee Area Transit Development Program.
62. 548 F.2d at 1287.
63. For the reasons stated in note 42 supra, it will be difficult in some instances to establish
the prerequisites under FED. R. Civ. P. 23, for maintaining a class action against an employer
who is guilty of discrimination against handicapped persons.
64. The similarity in the enforcement of Section 503 and 504. was emphasized by Senator
Robert Stafford of Vermont. Senator Stafford declared that "it was the Committee's intent that
the enforcement under Section 503 and 504 would be similar to that carried out under Section
601 of the Civil Rights Act and 901 of the Education Amendments" (emphasis added). See also
Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
65. In Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202 (N.D. Tex. 1977), the court found
that the plaintiff, a handicapped person, satisfied the first of the four Cort tests. This finding
should be very persuasive in favor of a private cause of action. See note 29 supra; see also Wood
v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003, 1008 (D.Del. 1977).
66. In Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. at 202, the District Court held that a private
cause of action would be inconsistent with Section 503. Accord, Wood v. Diamond State Tel.
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Unlike Section 504, Section 503 does provide for administrative
enforcement through the Department of Labor. 67 The presence of
an administrative remedy in the statute, while perhaps making the
need for a judicial remedy less compelling, will not, in itself, defeat
the judicial remedy. The Borak statute and the majority of other stat-
utes, under which the Supreme Court has inferred a private cause of
action, have contained alternative means of enforcement.68 The judi-
cial remedy is a necessary supplement to the enforcement
Co., 440 F. Supp. at 1008. The District Judge relied on the lack of any identifiable and
homogeneous class of handicapped persons-although, as previously noted, this factor speaks
eloquently in favor of a private cause of action for individual handicapped persons. See notes 42
and 63 supra.He also noted that handicaps often will affect job abilities and productivity. While
this may be a defense available to an employer, see note 43 supra, it is hardly a reason to find a
private cause of action inconsistent with Section 503. Indeed, the underlying presumption of the
statute is that handicapped persons make good employees and any generalized presumptions
against the employability of handicapped persons violates federal policy. Compare Gurmankin v.
Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. at 992 with City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 98 S.Ct. 1370 (April
25, 1978). The judge also commented that different treatment of the handicapped "normally
stems from sympathetic rather than intolerant motives." The Supreme Court has cautioned
against similar "'romantic paternalism" in a sex discrimination situation and noted that such
treatment "more often puts them [women] in a cage rather than on a pedestal." Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). Unfortunately, the same has too often been true of pater-
nalistic attitudes toward handicapped persons.
The District Judge in Frito-Lay also noted that Congress has repeatedly rejected attempts to
amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 to include protection to handicapped persons and
found this a persuasive reason why courts should not infer a private remedy under Section 503.
This conclusion does not follow. Title VII has broader coverage than Section 503 and requires
an injured party to submit his claim to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before
going to Court. The remedies afforded against racial discrimination in Title VII are separate and
distinct and do not supersede the remedies afforded against racial discrimination in Title VI of
the '64 Act, in Executive Order 11242 or under § 1981. Whether or not Congress gives hand-
icapped persons a remedy tinder Title VII, they have a separate and distinct remedy tinder
Section 503.
67. The Secretary of Labor has promulgated rules and regulations implementing his duties
under Section 503. See 41 C. F. R. 60-741-741.54 (1977).
68. See, e.g., J.1. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397
(1970); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). The Seventh Circuit has stated in dicta that normally a private
cause of action will not be implied where Congress has provided other means of enforcement.
Goldman v. First Fed. Savings & Loan of Wilmette, 518 F.2d 1247, 1250 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d at 1074 n.14. But the Supreme Court cases cited by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals do not go this far. For instance, the Supreme Court
simply noted in National A.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 457 (1974) (Amtrack), that "the inference of such a private cause of action not otherwise
authorized by the statute must be consistent with the evident legislative intent and, of course,
with the effectuation of the purposes intended to be served by the Act." These considerations
support a private cause of action under Section 503. The Supreme Court narrowly interpreted
Amtrack in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 81, 82 n.14, by finding specific support in the legislative
history of the Amtrack Act for the proposition that the statutory remedies were to be exclusive.
No such finding is evident in the legislative history of Section 503.
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mechanisms specified in Section 503. The Department of Labor can
require contractors to adopt affirmative action plans and refuse them
access to federal funds if they fail to comply with Departmental
guidelines.6 9 The courts can go further and, in appropriate cases,
grant injunctive relief or damages, including damages for mental an-
guish suffered by the plaintiff. A judicial remedy is fully consistent
with the Congressional plan and is necessary to make whole the
rights of handicapped persons protected under Section 503.70
CONCLUSION
A private cause of action under Sections 503 and 504 will insure
that handicapped persons are not relegated either to a sympathetic,
or, as the case may be, an apathetic bureaucracy for the enforcement
of their rights to equal employment opportunity. In keeping with the
intent of Congress to provide full protection to handicapped individu-
als, an appropriate interpretation of Sections 503 and 504 is one con-
sistent with other legislation in the increasingly burgeoning civil
rights arena in affording litigants a private right of action. Absent an
explicit congressional denial of a private right of action and given that
handicapped persons are especial beneficiaries of Sections 503 and
504, such a conclusion guarantees that aggrieved persons will be
guaranteed direct access to the courts with the full array of judicial
remedies.
69. Under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, progress pay-
ments can be withheld from an employer who violates the provisions of his affirmative action
plan, and, in an extreme case, the contract can be terminated and the employer barred from
receiving future government contracts. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.28(c), (d), and (e). In addition to
these remedies, the government can go to court for injunctive relief to require the employer to
comply with his affirmative action program. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.28(b). None of these remedies
is specifically tailored to make whole a person who has suffered employment discrimination.
Also, all too often the federal agency enforcement machinery in areas of civil rights has proved
inefficacious at best. Compare, Doe v. New York Univ., 442 F. Supp. at 523 with Crawford v.
University of N. Carolina, supra, so resort to the courts in the first instance is necessary to
protect individual rights which can not later be made whole by agency actions. Court proceed-
ings are also preferable because the plaintiff has control of his case and frequently court pro-
ceedings provide a speedier remedy than is available in the administrative process. By issuing
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, courts can prevent irreparable in-
jury-something the administrative process does not accomplish under Section 503.
70. Section 503 creates affirmative rights on behalf of private handicapped individuals under
the same analysis that the Supreme Court used under Title VI in Lau on behalf of Chinese
students and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals used under Section 504 in Lloyd on behalf of
handicapped individuals. Under Cori principles, handicapped persons are certainly the especial
beneficiaries of Section 503. See note 66 supra.
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